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n the course of the past three years, reform legislation has been enacted at a prodigious rate throughout Central and Eastern Europe and most countries have done their best to make things easier for foreign investors? Controversy about unwelcome foreign takeovers has been usually confined to parliamentary and press debates and has had no decisive influence on government policies. All the countries surveyed 2 rightly consider foreign investment as basic to engage their economy in a process of fundamental changes to a market economy.
Legal Framework for FDI
Three groups of countries can be distinguished, In the Czech and SIovak Republics and Hungary, provisions regulating FDI were subsumed into the corporate and other commercial laws for domestic investors and business. They now offer a sophisticated legal system, although, as everywhere, there are faults and gaps. Countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia offer a patchwork of laws, some modern and rather sophisticated, others rather peculiar. Poland is at an intermediate stage between the above countries and the others, while in Beiarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Albania only the basic legal essentials for business and foreign investment are in place.
While all countries allow the formation of joint ventures and fully foreign-owned companies, government approval, 9 OECD, Paris, France. This article is based on a forthcoming OECD publication on FDI in Central and Eastern Europe.
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in the form of a permit, is required in Latvia and Russia for all foreign participation exceeding a given amount of money or, as in the case of Belarus, 30 per cent of the founding capital. In Ukraine, a permit is required for leasing by a foreign investor of property owned by the state or municipal authorities whose balance sheet value exceeds US$1 million 9
If all countries have sectoral restrictions or barriers to inward FDI, almost half of them (Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Poland) have restricted foreign access in one or the other "traditional" areas of defence, public order, financial institutions, energy, aviation and shipping. Typically, the administrative procedures for registration and authorisation of FDI in these sectors are clear and transparent 9
Other countries exercise a greater degree of screening and have established more important barriers to admitting FDI. Among the fourteen countries surveyed in this paper, the former Soviet Republics tend to be more restrictive toward inward FDI. The lists of sectors prohibited for foreign investors or submitted to authorisation are often rather long, particularly in the case of Russia, Ukraine and the three Baltic states, which have substantial numbers of FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT "market reservation" schemes in manufacturing and service industries that permit only locally owned firms to operate. For example, the Lithuanian and Latvian legislations require that foreign investments be controlled by local nationals in certain industries, including mass media (Lithuania and Latvia), oil and gas pipelines, electric power, highways and railways and publishing (Lithuania) and, in Latvia, national education, fishing, hunting and port management.
Countries which restrict access to certain sectors or to sizeable operations through investment screening and restrictions actively encourage, on the other hand, foreign investment in certain priority sectors through incentives. In fact, all countries use the tax system as well as exemption from certain import duties and free economic zones to attract FDI. Foreign investors thus often enjoy better treatment than their domestic competitors in the field of taxation. A very few East European countries are abandoning the policy of generous tax incentives, mainly because of the exponential growth of tax revenue forgone and their marginal effect on FDI flows.
Despite these discrepancies, certain common characteristics in FDI policies can be identified. All countries have committed themselves to progressively introduce new tax systems and to conclude new bilateral agreements on the prevention of double taxation. Intergovernmental agreements on the protection of foreign investment following international standards are being re-negotiated bilaterally with investment partners. There has also been an intensive legislative search for an overall amelioration of the protection of intellectual property in line with market economy regulations.
Privatisation Policies
All governments of the region have been eager to develop privatisation programmes and legislation in order to reduce the role of the state as owner in the business sector. Various techniques of privatisation, conventional and non-conventional, have been conceptualised and already implemented in most countries: direct sales to predetermined owners, public auction and public tender as standard methods of privatisation; coupon system as a non-standard method. Again, legislation varies considerably: where the transition to a market economy started earlier (the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland), privatisation is organised by a set of practiceoriented laws, while in other countries privatisation laws often provide only a vague framework or guidelines.
Some programmes and methods have demonstrated caution about the extent of foreign involvement in the INTERECONOMICS, May/June 1993 privatisation process. In countries such as Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine, preferential conditions may apply for the employees of an enterprise, usually with the goal of ensuring social justice. In Russia, Decree 914 of 14 August 1992, which covers virtually all large and medium-sized enterprises, gives preferential rights to the workforce to purchase shares in the enterprise in which they work: up to 89 per cent of shares can be purchased by the employees and managers of the enterprise being privatised; the rest of the shares are made available to the general public, often including foreign investors. Employee and manager buy-outs, based on a kind of leasing scheme after the winding up of the state-owned company, are widespread in Poland (some 1,300 firms had been privatised by this method by June 1992).
Among the fourteen countries, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan and Russia have tended to be more selective concerning the extent of foreign involvement in the privatisation process. In two countries (Poland and Russia), special authorisation is sometimes needed by foreign investors to invest in a given privatised company; elsewhere, in Lithuania and Russia, lists of privatised enterprises barred to foreign investment have been established.
Legislation in almost all countries has also had to deal with the question of restitution or compensation, in kind or in other ways, fully or partially, to former owners whose business property was nationalised during the communist regime. This issue is important because handing back to the original owners or their heirs assets taken over by the communist regimes may constitute an obstacle to foreign investment when it takes the form of restitution of actual property instead of financial compensation. Some countries, such as the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland and Estonia, have tried to avoid large-scale restitution, preferring to offer financial compensation instead, while others, such as Bulgaria and Latvia, have favoured the restitution of property that had been confiscated. Elsewhere, the situation has not been completely clarified yet.
It may be too early to examine the impact of privatisation policies on FDI performance. Uncertainties with regard to privatisation programmes are very likely to put off foreign investors, while the impact of voucher systems for citizens and/or preferential treatment of enterprise employees is not a priori obvious. In Hungary, where privatisation policies follow a rather open course, US$ 770 million of foreign capital were invested in transformed and privatised companies by the beginning of 1992, in the form of sale or share capital increase. This represented some
